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ELECTION PRACTICES AT ROME 153-44 B. C. 
Introduction. 
It shall be my purpose in this thesis to discuss 
several of the various election practices prevailing at 
Rome during the period which began with Ti. Gracchus's 
entrance into politics in 133 B.C. and closed with the murder 
of Julius Caesar in 44 B.C. 
I have chosen this period because few references to 
election practices at Rome before the year 133 B.C. can be 
found, various Roman historians have left us accounts of laws 
forbidding certain election practices, which were passed before 
the time of Ti, Gracchus, However, from these we can merely 
conjecture what the practices were and to what extent they 
were prevalent. Moreover it was between the years 153-44 B.C. 
that we find the greatest political activity in Rome. 
My material has been collected from the following 
authors: 
Cicero—the entire correspondence and the following 
of his orations,—Pro Plancio, Pro Murena, Pro Milone, Pro Scauro 
Pro Sulla, Pro Sestio, Pro Rabirio, In Toga Candida, In vatinhim, 
and the letter of Q. Cicero—De Petitione Consulatus; Dio Cassius 
Livy and Appian- Bellum Civile. 
2. 
Discussion. 
The Roman people expected their candidates to 
give evidence of certain qualities and of fitness for office 
much as the people of the present day expect these same things 
of their candidates. 
First of all the ideal Roman candidate must give 
evidence of integrity and general strength of character. 
Especially was this true of the candidates for the consulship. 
It is true that corrupt individuals often gained the office of 
consul by resorting to various practices which will be dis­
cussed later. Yet for the most part only men of great integrity 
and honesty dared stand for this office. The rank of a candi­
date was often a great aid to him in his canvass, but a man of 
high rank with a defective character was often rejected for a 
man of lower rank with good character or occasionally for a 
"novus homo." Q. Gicero in the De Petitions Consulatus en­
courages M. Cicero, a "novus homo" with these words, "It is 
also a great set-off to your "newness" that the nobles who are 
your competitors are of such a kind that no one can venture to 
say that their nobility ought to stand them in greater stead 
than your high character. For instance who could think of 
P. Galba and L. Cassius, tho* by birth of the highest rank, 
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as candidates for the consulship? You see therefore that there 
are men of the moblest families who from defect of character 
are not your equals. But you will say Catiline and Antonius 
are formidable. Rather I should say that a man of energy, 
industry, unimpeachable character, great eloquence, and high 
popularity with those who are the ultimate judges, should wish 
for such rivals, both from their boyhood stained with blood and 
lust, both of ruined fortunes#1! (De Petitione Consulatus II). 
Cicero realized all this for he himself said a man 
ought to rely on his dignity of birth, of integrity and of 
industry when he offers himself as a candidate for the consul­
ship. (Pro Murena VII). 
A candidate was not required to be a master of any 
particular art or science or to be a fluent speaker—but he must 
have integrity. This does not mean that the Romans scorned 
business ability or eloquence—far from that these two qualities 
were often a candidate's best assets. All other things being 
equal, the man with these qualities was chosen. Cicero 
(Pro Murena XI) says that the power of eloquence was of great 
value and was often of influence in the election of a candidate. 
"For the newness of your name you will best compensate by the 
brilliancy of your oratory. That has ever carried with it great 
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political distinction, A man who is held worthy of defending 
consulars can not be thought unworthy of the consulship. 
(Be Petition© Consulatus I). 
No matter how worthy a candidate might be, if he did 
not go about earnestly canvassing for the votes of the people, 
he never won election to any office. It was not enough for him 
to announce his candidacy and then calmly await the day of 
election. The candidate announced his candidacy a year before 
the election was to be held and all that year he was busy 
working for election. There were certain things which every 
candidate was expected to do. To neglect them meant disaster. 
In the time of Cicero it had become the custom for all 
candidates to go to the houses of almost all the citizens and 
from their countenances the voters formed an opinion as to the 
spirits of the candidates and what hope of success each had. 
(Pro Murena XXI). 
The citizens evidently were influenced by the attitude 
the candidate took toward his candidacy. Often their judgment 
gave way before the candidate's earnestness; any past kindness 
of the candidate toward any of the voters was always remembered 
during the canvass and at election time. If the recipients of 
these favors failed to recall them, the candidate did not. 
Q. Cicero urged his brother to especially canvass votes from 
those whom he had defended in the last few years before his 
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candidacy for the consulship. "And speaking generally, since 
your candidate is most strongly supported by that class of 
friendships which you have gained as a counsel for the defense, 
take care tnat to all those whom you have placed under obliga­
tion to you, their duty should in every case be clearly 
defined and set forth. And as you have never been importunate 
with them so be careful tnat they understand that you have 
reserved for this occasion all that you consider them to owe 
you." (De Petitione Consulatus v). 
Cicero himself says that the citizens were often 
led to vote not because of the merit of the candidate but 
because of their obligations to the candidate. "At all 
comitia and especially those held for the election of aediles, 
it is the party spirit of the people and not their deliberate 
judgment which bears sway; their votes are coaxed out of them, 
not extorted by merit, the voters are more apt to consider what 
obligation they themselves are under to each individual than 
what benefits the republic has received at his hands." 
(Pro Planeio IV). 
The ability to flatter the voters was a very 
necessary quality of the candidate. One form which the 
flattery of a Roman candidate took was to assume great 
friendliness toward every one. The candidate also made an 
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attempt to call ©very one by his name and speak to them as 
tho1 he were personally acquainted with them. This does not 
mean that the candidates actually knew the names of all whom 
they met. They were always accompanied on their canvass by a 
"nomenclator," —one of their slaves whose sole duty was to 
learn the names of every one and to be able to recognize 
them and to tell their name© to the candidate.1 (Pro Murena XXXVI). 
Another form of winning the people was by giving 
banquets. The candidate was not only expected to attend these 
but he was expected to have his own friends attend. These 
banquets were given sometimes for all the people or were 
given to certain tribes. This practice was expected of the 
candidate and was not considered illegal—as were certain of 
the practices which will be taken up later. 
The candidate was expected also to give assistance 
to any who might desire it. This was an exceedingly difficult 
thing to do for the candidate could not afford to take up any 
case which would do him harm in his canvass for election. 
Cicero speaks of a case which he was asked to take when he 
was a candidate for the consulship. He had to refuse it 
because Satyrus, against whom he would appear, was very in­
fluential and was greatly attached to him. Satyrus had been 
of great service to both Cicero and his brother Q. Cicero, 
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at previous elections. Cicero's success of election depended 
to a great extent upon this man and his good friend 
Domitixis. (Att. I, 1). 
The practices of giving banquets, rendering 
assistance, and being within reach of all, came under tne 
general head of n liberalitasOf this Q. Cicero said, 
"It (liberalitas) may again be displayed in giving practical 
assistance, which I would have you render available far and 
wide; and be careful therein to be accessible to all by day 
and night, and not only by the doors of your house, but by 
your face and countenance, which is the door of the mind. 
—-It is an easy rule to make that you should indicate 
that whatever you are going to do, you will do with heartiness 
and pleasure; it is scmewnat more difficult and rather a 
concession to the necessities of the moment than to your in­
clination, that when you cannot do a thing you should either 
promise or put your refusal pleasantly; the latter is the 
conduct of a good man, the former of a good candidate. For 
when a request is made which we cannot grant with honor or 
without loss to ourselves—for instance, if a man were to ask 
us to appear in a suit against a friend, a refusal must be 
given in a gentlemanly way; you must show that you are ex­
ceedingly sorry, must convince him that you will make up for 
it in other ways." (De Petition© Consulatus XI). 
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It was not expected that a candidate should look 
for material for a prosecution against his competitors or 
any one else. His whole attention was to be given to his 
canvass if he expected to win. Cicero says, "At the less 
important comitia, honors are gained by the diligence and 
influence of the candidates, and not by those high qualities 
which we see in you—Laterensis(Pro Plancio III.). 
In 64 when Laterensis and Planeius were candidates 
for the aediieship, the former early in his canvass began to 
pay more attention to gathering material for a prosecution 
against Plane ius than he did to his own canvass. This appears 
to have lost him the confidence of a great many people. The 
Romans expected a candidate to conduct his canvass diligently 
and generally were influenced by the keenness of his canvass. 
"In the comitia the people does not invariably act in 
obedience to its judgment but it is usually influenced by 
interest or it yields to entreaties and it elects those by 
whom it has been canvassed with the greatest assiduity." 
(Pro Planeio IV.). 
The Romans assumed that a candidate had given up ail 
hope of election when he began to turn his attention to 
provocations. When he no longer went about with a confident 
and hopeful air,—-when h© devoted more of his attention to uhe 
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methods of his competitor's canvass than he did to his own— 
then his adherents quickly deserted him. 
It was during his canvass for office that the 
candidate learned the value of friends. Then he found how 
many time friends he had and to what extent they were willing 
to help him. If he could not rely on his friends for support, 
his canvass for office was useless. 
The candidate was expected to form a large number 
of new friendships. If he failed to make any, or at least to 
make an effort to form a number of strong friendships, he was 
considered worthless as a candidate. During a canvass the 
word ^friends" had a wider application than usual. Anyone 
who showed the slightest inclination toward friendliness for 
the candidate was encouraged—efforts were made by the candidate 
to keep him as a friend. Those who habitually visited at the 
house of the candidate were likewise looked upon as friends. 
Friends of every class were to be secured. First— 
those for sho?/—that is prominent men who might not give any 
actual assistance but might by their apparent friendship with 
the candidate attract a large number of voters. Second— 
magistrates who by their positions could maintain the candi­
date's rights—the consuls were considered first in importance 
and then the tribunes. 
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To have won the support of these two magistracies 
meant much for the candidate. By reason of their great power 
they could withhold, or remove any one's name from the list of 
candidates. 
Livy (Bk. LXXXIX) tells us that Lucretius Ofella was 
pu.t to death in the Forum by Sulla's command because he had 
declared himself a candidate for the consulship without having 
previously obtained Sulla's permission. This is of course an 
extreme case since Sulla was dictator at the time, and exercised 
supreme control in the state. But there are instances given 
whe,re the regular magistrates were able to prevent the election 
of certain candidates. 
Pompey while consul with Crftssus in 55, was holding 
an assembly for the election of praetors. Cato who was one of 
his political opponents, offered himself as a candidate. When 
Pompey saw that the assembly was unanimous for Cato, he 
announced that he heard a clap of thunder. This was of course 
an ill omen. Thus Pompey secured an adjournment of the 
assembly and succeeded in preventing Cato's election to 
office. (Plut.—Pomp. 52; Cato Min. 42.). 
Another instance which shows the necessity of having 
the consul for a friend,or at least not an open enemy, is the 
case of Antony and Dol&bella. Antony who was both augur and 
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consul-in 49 was presiding over the electoral assembly. He 
allowed the voting to continue until a majority was nearly 
reached for Do label la. Then by making use of the augural 
formula, he adjourned the meeting. There was nothing illegal 
about this proceeding, but Antony for a long time before the 
election had declared that by augury he would prevent 
Dolabe11a's election. (Phil. II, 33). 
In the year 57 when Clodius was a candidate for 
the aedileship, Milo who was tribune, had declared that he 
would take the auspices on all comitial days. Then by 
announcing unfavorable omens he prevented the elections being 
held. Milo even went to Campus Martius with an armed iaob 
before midnight of the day preceding the election and re­
mained there until after midday the next day. It was then 
too late to hold the elections because the electoral assembly 
usually met at sunrise and could not convene after midday. 
Hence Milo's action in remaining in the Campus with his armed 
mob until after midday. (Att IV, 3). 
The third class of friends to be won were those 
who held control of the votes of tribes or centuries, or had 
hope of winning these votes. These frionds were of the highest 
importance. The candidate needed someone on whom ne could rely 
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to gain him large numbers of votes. It was usual for friends 
of the candidate to oanvass in their own tribes for votes; they 
also canvassed votes from the members of their own class, and 
in other tribes where they had warm and influential friends. 
(Pro Planeio XIX). 
In 64 when Plancius was candidate for aedileship, 
his father, a farmer of the revenues, was of great service 
to him in winning the support of the revenue farmers. This 
meant much for Plancius for the revenue farmers seem to have 
been of great assistance to candidates. In the first place 
they were always men of prominence and were especially in­
fluential among the "aquites" from which class they were 
chosen. Then too in collecting the revenues, they employed a 
large number of men and the revenue farmers could control the 
votes of all whom they employed. Gicero says, "I will even 
add, if you like, that which you consider is even an objection 
to him, that his father is a farmer of the revenues. And who 
is there who does not know what a great assistance that body 
of men is to anyone in seeking for an honor?" (Pro Plancio IX). 
Friends of the candidate tried to win the votes of 
those of their friends who were not frionds of the candidate. 
Gicero in a letter to Atticus urges him to help him in this 
way in his canvass for the consulship. "Your early return is 
of great importance to me, for there is a very strong idea 
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prevailing that some intimate frionds of yours, persons of 
high rank, will be opposed to my election. To v/in me their 
favor, I see that I shall want you very much. Wherefore be 
sure to be in Rome in January as you have agreed to be. 
(Att. I, 2). 
In addition to his friends, a candidate depended 
largely upon his attendants. His strength as a candidate 
was judged by his throng of attendants—the idea being pre­
sumably that the greater the crowd in attendance upon a candi­
date, the greater his popularity. 
There were tore© classes of attendants also. One 
was the morning oallers who went to the candidate's house; 
another—those who escorted him to the Forum; the last—those 
who attended him in his canvass. 
The first class was less select than the others and 
therefore greater in number. The candidate made an especial 
effort to make this class feel that he valued their attention 
very highly. He likewise gave the second class the impression 
that their escort was a great help to him in his canvass. The 
third class was of course of greater value than either of the 
others. The candidate persuaded them that he was under a 
great obligation to them for their aid in his canvass. This 
class was generally made up of those whom the candidate had 
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helped in some way. In Cicero's case these attendants were 
those whom he had defended. This was the cla3s whom his 
brother urged him to try to attach to himself. 
(De Petitions Gonsulatus V). 
The attendants were supposed to attach themselves 
to the candidate of their own accord. This was of course 
legal and considered a proper election practice. But candi­
dates often became so eager for a large tnrong of attendants 
that they hired men to go about with them, or hired men to go 
out from Home to meet them as they were returning from their 
provinces for the elections. This was an illegal practice. 
The Fabian law passed in 66 sought to regulate the number of 
men who could legally form this voluntary escort. Just what 
this number was is not given by Cicero who seems to be the 
only author who mentions it. (Pro Murena XXXII; XXXIH;XXXXV). 
From this it is easy to see how the fact that a 
candidate was apparently in high favor, influenced the Ramans. 
They seem to have considered a throng of attendants evidence 
of the candidate's fitness for office. 
This act of attendance on a candidate was a source 
of great pleasure to the common people. It was their only 
means of doing the candidate a favor. They realized that 
they had no great influence alone; they could not offer to a 
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candidate the vote of a century or tribe, but they could by 
their constant attendance show others how popular the candidate 
was. 
During his canvass for office the candidate made 
an especial effort to form friendships with men of great 
political influence. These men did not of course attend the 
candidate bit since each great political man of the day had 
his own crowd of attendants and friends it was worth while for 
the candidate to court his favor. These men were not necessarily 
men who held office, yet they controlled a large number of 
votes. Quite often they were generals or men of great wealth. 
To fail to win the support of these men was disastrous for the 
candidate. Cicero when candidate for the consulship made a 
great effort to win Pompey's favor. He wrote to Atticus, 
"You must undertake to secure for me the "entourage" of our 
friend Pompey since you are nearer than I." (Att. I,l). 
Of course the fact that men of prominence were in 
favor of a candidate influenced the votes of others. "We 
must also take care taat every one knov/s that Cn. Pompeius is 
strongly in your favor and that it amphatically suits his 
purpose that you should win your election'.' (De Petitione Consulatus XIII). 
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Caesar upon his return from Spain in 60 began to 
canvass for the office of consul and earnestly courted the 
favor of both Pompey and Cr$ssus. At this time, these two men 
were at enmity with each othor, but Caesar was so skillful 
that he won them both, and their political clubs as well, to 
his side. (Dio Cassins XXXvII, 54). 
Candidates often combined forces and tried to over­
come the force of competition. When oandidates united forces 
in this way they promised one another a favorable vote from 
their followers. The formation of the triumvirate just 
mentioned is perhaps the best known instance of a coalition 
of this sort. Then after the conference at Luca in 56, Pompey and 
Croesus again formed a coalition and secured their re-election 
as consuls. (Appian Civil Wars II, 3). 
C# Plancius who was elected aedile in 64 was charged 
by Laterensis, one of his competitors, with having entered 
into a coalition with Plotius, another of the candidates. He 
said that they had pledged the votes of two different tribes 
to himself and Pedius at an earlier comitia and then had with­
drawn them at the comitia by which they were elected. 
(Pro Planeio XXII). 
By the formation of coalitions candidates often 
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won ©lection, who might not have been able to, bad they stood 
alone. Frequently a man who had accomplished a great many 
things, but had not the means to conduct his canvass, would 
unite with a man of less interest but greater wealth. Thus 
both would profit by the coalition. Suetonius is authority 
for the statement that Caesar in 60 formed such a coalition 
with L, Lucceius, but Lucceius was defeated by Bibulus. 
(Suet. Caes. XIX). 
The elections were supposed to be held in July 
before the new officials assumed their various duties in 
either December or January, yet they were often postponed,— 
sometimes for a few weeks or months and occasionally for a 
year or more. 
Elections could be postponed for any one of several 
reasons. Unfavorable omens was the most frequent cause for 
postponement. In 84 after Cinna the consul had been killed, 
\ 
the tribunes urged Carbo to come back to the city and hold an 
election for the choice of a colleague. But Carbo did not 
return until they threatened to reduce him to the rank of a 
private citizen. The elections were postponed on account of 
unfavorable omen3, to another day. Lightning struck two 
temples on that day so the augurs prorogued the comitia beyond 
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the summer solstice and Carbo continued to be sole consul. 
(Appian Civil Wars I, 9). In thi3 case tnere seems to have 
been real evidence of unfavorable omens but elections were 
often postponed at the will of those holding them, on the 
plea of unfavorable omens. Several instances of this have 
already been given. 
In 67 when Cicero was candidate for the praetorship, 
the elections were twice postponed. Dio Cassius (XXXVI 38 & 39) 
says that the senate in this year was trying to hinder the 
legislation of the tribune fi. Calpurnius against bribery. 
The comitia were announced and then postponed from time to 
time; no laws could be enacted until after they were held. It 
was at this time that Cicero wrote to Atticus, "Let me tell 
you that there is no class of people at Rome so harassed by 
every kind of unreasonable difficulty as candidates for 
office, and that no one knows when the elections will be." 
(Att. I, 1). 
Often tribunes, consuls, and the candidates for 
office succeeded in having the elections postponed. In the 
case of the tribunes and consuls, the purpose was to keep 
persons whom they disliked from being elected to office. 
The candidates' purpose was to cause their opponents to 
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become discouraged and withdraw. The candidates themselves 
could not postpone the elections, but they might persuade 
friendly magistrates to do so. 
Bibulus while consul succeeded in postponing the 
elections of 59 from July until October in order to prevent 
the election of Clodius to the tribuneship. (Att. II, 20& 23). 
In 53 all the tribunes introduced a number of 
obstructive pleas, proposing for one thing to appoint military 
tribunes so that more persons might hold office. When they 
could find no one who would pay any attention to them, they 
insisted that Pampey must be chosen dictator. Since Pompey 
was not at Rome at this time, they secured a long delay. 
Pompey finally returned to Rome and refused to become dictator. 
He thereupon had consuls appointed but these, because of the 
turbulent state of affairs failed to appoint successors. So 
by the postponoient of elections and by the turmoil within the 
state, at the beginning of the year 52 the Romans were 
absolutely without government in three branches—consul, 
praetor and prefect were not chosen. (Dio Cassius XL, 45.). 
Because there were no consuls elected for the year 
52, Rome was the scene of great strife. Murders were frequent, 
elections were postponed from one time to another, altho' 
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there were plenty of eager candidates who freely employed 
bribery and assassination in order to win election if possible. 
It was at this time that Milo assassinated Clodius. 
(Dio Cassius XL, 48). 
This use of force to secure election was not at all 
unusual in the turbulent times of the late republic. In 52 
at the time of the occurrence Just mentioned, the three candi­
dates for the office of consul, Hypsaeus, Scipio and Milo, 
carried on their strife in such a manner that they came at 
last to open violence, which caused a general tumult in the 
city. In order to restore order, Pompey, altho1 he was absent 
from the city, was elected consul for the third time and was 
to serve as sole consul. (Livy CVII). 
No matter how popular the Roman candidate was or 
how well fitted for office he was, there was always one thing 
against which he had to contend—the employment of bribery by 
his opponents. Solicitation of votes and open or secret 
influence and bribery were among the means by which a candidate 
secured his election to any office. The reason for resorting 
to such means was that the rivalry between candidates was keen-
first because there was great opportunity offered to officials 
in the way of influence at Romaj second—the officials also 
had the chance to acquire great wealth when they went out to 
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govern a province after their consulship. This was perhaps 
a greater incentive than the fact that they would be influen­
tial at Rome after their term of office. Hence it was 
necessary for the candidates to make a great effort to secure 
the votes of the citizens. Bribery came to be the chief means 
which this was done. 
Bribery by no means developed at Rome only in the 
period under consideration. On the contrary, practically all 
of the references we find to election practices before the 
year 133, are in regard to bribery. A summary of some of the 
laws of this period will show this. 
The first law in regard to election practices of 
which mention is made is a law passed in the year 432, This 
law forbade candidates for office to whiten their garments. 
There is some doubt among historians about such a law having 
been in existence. If there was such a law, its enforcement 
cannot have been very strict for the practice of candidates 
appearing in freshly whitened garments prevailed until the 
end of the republic. However this change of opinion in 
regard to the whitening of the toga may have been similar to 
the change of attitude toward "Ambitus," This expression 
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originally meant nothing more than the canvassing of a candidate 
and did not imply anything illegal. But because it became the 
custom for candidates to attempt to win an election by any 
means and to purchase votes whenever it was possible, "ambitus" 
came to mean bribery. 
Livy says that this law was passed in the year 432 
but he states in a later part of his history that the first 
lex de ambitu was passed in 358—so the law of 432 may never 
have been passed. The law of 358—a plebiscite—forbade 
candidates for office to visit markets and meeting places 
outside the city for electioneering purposes. The reason for 
this law as given by Livy was to check the rise of "novi homines," 
who were accustomed to solicit votes in this manner. This seems 
a very plausible reason, for after the enactment of this law 
until the last century of the republic it required a great 
effort for a "novus homo" to be elected to office. Cicero 
and Mar ins are the two famous examples of the few "novi homines" 
who were successful candidates. Quintus Cicero in De Petition© 
Consulatus constantly urges his brother to remember that be 
is a "novus homo" and the city in which he is seeking election 
is Home. His attitude shows what a difficult thing it was for 
a "novus homo" to be elected to office even as late as 64 B.C. 
23. 
Whatever the reason for the law of 358, it is almost 
certain that it was never enforced, at least not very rigidly 
or for a very long period. Like the questionable law of 
432 it seems to have carried with it no penalty for its 
violation. 
The next lex de ambitu of which we have any 
knowledge is the lex Cornelia-Baebia of 181. This law was 
proposed by the consuls P. Cornelius and M. Baebius Tamphilus. 
It provided for the prosecution of bribery and disqualified 
for office for ten years any person found guilty of resorting 
to bribery or any other illegal means of winning an election. 
This law was ineffectual and necessitated the passage of 
another law. 
In 159 the consuls Cn. Cornelius Dolabella and 
M. Fulvius Nobilior proposed a lex de ambitu which forbade 
the use of bribery and increased the penalty to death. 
The purpose of both these laws seems to have been to diminish 
the eagerness for office among the unscrupulous nobles — 
and both were ineffectual. 
The most important legislation of the next hundred 
years in regard to elections were the laws of 139, 137 and 
131. In 139 the Gabian law—a plebiscite—was enacted, which 
provided for the use of secret ballots at elections. This 
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election reform was made necessary by the fhct that the 
poorer class at Rome, thrti1 the monopolization of public land 
by the rich, had fallen into economic helplessness and were 
forced to depend on the rich. 
Rome was not a manufacturing center, so there could 
be no employment in ractorios offered to the poor who were 
driven into Rome from the country districts. It is true that 
Rome was at this time a great shipping center, but the ship 
owners manned their ships with slaves and this means of earn­
ing money was denied the poor. They could not even find em­
ployment on the large estates of the rich, altho1 many laws 
were passed fixing the proportion of slave and free labor on 
estates. These laws as well as many others, the rich Raman 
found ways of evading. The poor had to have some means of 
supporting themselves. All kinds of honest labor were denied 
them. There seemed to be nothing left for them to do but to 
become dependents of the rich class. This made it easy to 
buy their votes and consequently their votes came to be valuable 
both to themselves and to the politicians. 
The Gabinian law was followed in 137 by the 
lex Cassia which made provision for the use of the secret ballot 
at all meetings of the comita as a court—with the exception 
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of cases of " perduellio." The lex Papiria of 131 made the 
same provision for the comitia as a legislative body. 
This summary gives some idea of the prevalence of 
bribery and of the efforts made to check it, and also of 
the futility of the laws against it. 
Money was paid out freely for votes. In order to 
secure secrecy, the candidates employed "interpretes" to 
arrange with the electors for the purchase of their votes, 
and "sequestres" to keep the money until time for it to be 
paid out and "divisores" to distribute it among the electors. 
Bribes were usually offered to the tribes as a whole and not 
to the individuals. The custom seems to have been to classify 
the people and to divide the tribes into decuries. The money 
was then distributed among them either by the candidates 
themselves or by agents appointed by them for this purpose. 
(Pro Planeio XVI & X IX). 
The rogatio ae ambitu of the tribune C. Cornelius—67-— 
sought to severely punish not only candidates but also their 
agents—the "divisoresThe senate declared that this law 
was too severe and that neither accusers nor jurors could be 
found to enforce it; the law was put in the hands of the 
consuls, C. Calpurnius Piso and M1 Acilius 6-labrio, to revise 
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if possible. These consuls were both liable to the existing 
law on bribery, yet they had to revise the law proposed by 
Cornelius and present it to the comitia. The Acilian-
C-alpurnian law passed in this manner inflicted on those found 
guilty a heavy fine and forever disqualified them from holding 
office or sitting in the senate. The lex Fabia de ramiero 
sectatorum of 66 was a supplement to this law. 
Dio Cassius (XXXvI, 40) states that the Romans 
took such good care about this time not to have any bribery 
that in addition to punishing those convicted, they further­
more honored the accusers. 
Just before this time the names of 64 senators had 
been removed from the roll and this had increased the number 
of candidates for office in the years 69-66. With more com­
petition, bribery increased and there was greater extrava­
gance in public games and entertainments. In 68 C. Calpurnius 
Piso won his election as consul by bribery. He bought off his 
accusers who threatened a prosecution and actually served as 
consul in 67. (Dio Cassius XXXVI 38 & 39). 
Prom this year on until the outbreak of the 
between Pampey and Caesar, there are numerous references made 
by Roman writers to the prevalence of bribery and corruption. 
Every one seems to have gone mad with the idea of holding office 
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and was willing to sacrifice almost anything to gain their 
object. The people seemed to have responded readily to all 
the candidates' proposals to buy their votes, for laws 
against bribery were proposed and passed but they were of no 
avail. It was probably such a situation as this that 
Q# Cicero had in mind when he wrote, "The chief plague spot 
of our state is that it allows the prospect of a bribe to 
blind it to virtue and worth," (Do Petitione Consulatus Xiv)# 
Coalitions and conspiracies of every kind were 
formed. Livy (Bk. CI) says that in 66 a conspiracy was formed 
by those who had been found guilty of bribery in seeking the 
consulship, to murder the consuls, A very few years later 
we read of the famous conspiracy of Catiline. Antonius and 
Catiline in their eagerness to win election to the consulship, 
practiced such open bribery that the senate found it necessary 
to pass a new and rigorous law. This law—lex Tullia—increased 
the penalty on "divisores" and forbad© any one within two years 
preceding the announcement of a candidacy to give gladiatorial 
shows, except in fulfillment of a testament. The penalty 
for a convicted candidate was ten years' exile. Catiline 
rightly thought that this la?/ had been made on his acoount and 
planned, by collecting a small band, to slay Cicero and some 
others of the foremost men, on the day of the election, in 
order tnat he might be immediately chosen Consul. (Dio Cassius XXXvII,29). 
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But this law stringent as it wast did not effectively 
check bribery or any other of the corrupt election practices, 
vatinius when candidate for praetor gave gladiatorial shows 
f o r  t h e  p e o p l e  i n  o p e n  v i o l a t i o n  o f  t h i s  l a w .  ( i n  v a t i n i u m  M M ) .  
Shortly after this time Aufidius Lurco, a tribune, 
proposed a law to the effect that promises of money to tribes 
should not be binding, but that a candidate who actually 
paid it, should be liable for life to a payment—apparently 
annual--of 3000 sesterces to the tribe. This failed to 
become a lav.r. In the same year—61—a decree was passed which 
declared that all who had bribery agents in their houses should 
be declared guilty of treason. (Att. I, 16). 
The coalition between J. Caesar and L, Lucceius—60— 
has already been mentioned. Lucceius was a man of great 
wealth and in entering into the coalition he had promised to 
give money to the electors in the name of Caesar and himself. 
The Aristocratic party feared Gaesar and was alarmed at 
the prospect of the election of both Caesar and Lucceius. 
The aristocrats accordingly advised Bibulus to promise the 
electors as much money as Caesar and Lucceius did. Most of 
them even contributed toward the fund Bibulus needed for this 
par pose. Cato, who was usually radically opposed to such 
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measures admitted that bribery under sucli circumstances was 
for the public good. Bibulus succeeded in defeating but one 
of the candidates—Lucceius. (Suet. Gaes. XIX). 
In the year 56 Cicero is knovm to have defended 
L. Calpurnis4SFiso Bestia, a candidate in the preceding 
election of aediles, on a charge of bribery. (Q. ?r. II, 3). 
The year 54 was famous for bribery and corruption 
in general, Appian (Civil War II, 2) says that in this year 
the magistrates were chosen by means of money and faction 
fights, with dishonest zeal and with the aid of stones and 
even swords. Bribery and corruption prevailed in the most 
scandalous manner. The people went already bought to the 
elections. One case was found where a deposit of 800 
talents had been made to obtain the consulship. (Q. Fr. II, 14). 
Cicero in writing of the increase of bribery says 
there never was anything equal to it. The rate of interest 
rose from four per cent to eight per cent because of a. 
compact made between Memmius and the consul, Domitius. 
Arrangements Y?ere made to offer 1Q,000 sestertia for the vote 
of the first century. The candidates for the tribuneship 
made a compact and deposited 500 sestertia apiece with Cato 
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and agreed to conduct their canvass according to his direction, 
with the understanding that anyone offending against it was 
to be condemned by Cato. In regard to this compact Cicero says, 
"If this election turns out to be pure, Cato will have been of 
more avail than all the laws and jurors put together." (Q. Fr. II, 14.) 
In this same year, a compact was formed between C. Memraius 
and Domitius Calvinus, candidates for consul, and the consuls 
of that year. Both candidates were to forfeit to the consuls 
40 seetertia apiece (if they should be elected consuls) if they 
would not produce—first—three augurs to depose that they 
had been present at the passing of a lex curiata—which had 
not been passed; second—two consulars to testify that -they 
had helped to draft a decree for furnishing the consular pro­
vinces, tho' there had been no meeting of the senate. In 
return the consuls were to use their influence in gaining 
votes for these candidates. The announcement of this compact 
caused much excitement, ruined the reputations of the consuls 
and lost Memmans, who disclosed it, his election. (Att. IV, 16 & 1 7). 
In another of Cicero's letters, mention is made of 
M. Sufenas and C. Cato being acquitted of bribery. "From which 
we have learned that our treble-distilled Areopagites care not 
31. 
a rush for bribery, elections, interregnum or in fact for the 
state generally," is Cicero's comment on the situation. 
(Att. IV, 15). 
The case of Gcaiirus a candidate for the consulship 
in 54, is rather an interesting one. He had been charged 
with extortion in Sardinia. The trial had been hastened that 
he might not use the Sardinian money in bribing for the con­
sulship. He was acquitted, but it was too late for him to 
win his election. He immediately paid the people, tribe by 
tribe, at his own house, what they expected. He was more 
generous than his competitors but they had started to bribe 
before he nad been able to distribute any money and so had 
an advantage over him. (Att. IV, 16 & 1 7). 
All of the candidates of this year were prosecuted 
for bribery. Good men would not stand for office and the 
disorder was such that in 53 Home was without consuls for 
eight months. 
Just such election practices as these that have 
been described prevailed until the end of the republic. With 
the overthrow of Pompey and the Aristocratic party, elections 
ceased to be so important. Caesar assumed entire control of 
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the nomination of candidates and consequently elections 
came to be little more tnan a matter of voting for whomso­
ever it might please Caesar to nominate. 
Conclusion. 
There were two factors in the develojment of 
corrupt election practices,—first—the plebeians had become 
economically dependent upon the riph; second—the magistracies 
were open to a comparatively small number of people. 
The first of these causes was largely the result 
of a long period of wars which closed in 146 B.C. Rome had 
been engaged in a long struggle for supremacy with foreign 
nations. This called the greater part of her plebeian class 
into service as soldiers. Before this time Rome had been 
largely an agricultural community. Whan the plebeians 
were called to war, it meant that the greater part of the 
farms were deserted. Because of lack of cultivation for a 
long period of years, these lands gradually deteriorated in 
value. Then too during this period the Carthaginian armies, 
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by their occupation of Italy had done great harm to the 
farm lands. These two things had a tendency to make the 
plebeian's land almost worthless to him upon his return from 
the wars. In fact the plebeian was lucky if he could hold 
his land at all. It was usually taken for debts contracted 
while serving in the army. 
The wars had also increased slavery. Large 
numbers of captives were brought to Rome and sold as 
slaves. This worked a hardship on both the free laborer 
and the small farmer. The free laborer was paid very little 
for his services because slave labor was even cheaper. The 
small farmer soon found it useless to try to compete with 
the larger landowner whose work was done by slaves. Neither 
could he profitably compete with the importers of foreign 
produce. 
Everything seemed to be combined against the plebeians 
they were finally forced to desert the country and drift into 
Rome, here their number was increased by many who had been 
unwilling to return to their former occupation after their 
dismissal from the army. Rome had no employment to offer 
this great body of people. What few industries there were 
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at this time, were practically all carried on by slaves 
of the proprietors. Gradually this body of unemployed 
people fell into economic dependence upon the ri<»h. Each 
wealthy man finally had his own small army of retainers. 
Because they were dependent upon him, he entirely directed 
their political activities. Whenever opportunity offered, 
this dependent class was willing to sell its vote and it 
thus came to be an important political factor. 
The fact that the class of people who could hold 
office was small, was almost as important a factor in the 
development of this political situation. The offices were 
held by the same class of people year after year. It was 
almost an impossibility for any one outside of this class to 
be elected to office. The right of the "nobilitas" to hold 
office had become practically hereditary. Probably not 
more than seven or eight "novi homines" were ever elected to 
office. Because so few people could hold office, the rivalry 
between candidates was keen. Candidates were willing to 
resort to any means in order to win election. Bribery as 
we have seen, came to be their chief help in securing an 
office. 
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Another reason for this keen competition between 
candidates was the fact tnat many of them were bankrupt. 
The offices they sought were not in themselves of financial 
value to tiiem, but it was usual for the magistrates to 
spend the year following their year of office, as governors 
of the provinces. Ex-magistrates who went out to govern 
provinces almost always returned to Rome as men of wealth. 
This opportunity to plunder tho provinces and amass fortunes 
was perhaps a greater incentive than any honors they might 
gain as magistrates. Because such opportunities to amass 
a fortune quickly ware offered, the office-seekers were 
willing to resort to almost any means to win election. 
The purchase of votes was tne surest method and finally 
became almost the only method. 
Tins moral degeneracy on the part of both the 
office-seekers and tne great mass of the electors might be 
said to have been the chief cause for the development of 
Rome's corrupt election practices. 
